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Chlorine gas represents a hazardous material threat from industrial accidents and as a terrorist weapon. 
This review will summarize recent events involving chlorine disasters and its use by terrorists, discuss 
pre-hospital considerations and suggest strategies for the initial management for acute chlorine exposure 
events. [West J Emerg Med. 2010; 11(2):151-156.]
INTRODUCTION
Once used as a chemical weapon in the World War I, 
chlorine gas has long been known for its pulmonary irritant 
properties. Many chlorine exposures are the result of accidents 
at swimming pools and mixing of household agents. However, 
recent events in the Iraq war, the war on terror and large-
scale industrial incidents have demonstrated that chlorine 
represents a persistent hazardous material (HAZMAT) threat. 
Massive quantities of chlorine are stored and transported 
across the United States with minimal security. Chlorine 
has been successfully used as an unconventional weapon in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. In this article, we will review the 
domestic threats of chlorine exposure, discuss its use as an 
unconventional weapon, review toxicologic principles, and 
examine treatment of chlorine-related casualties. We will 
also discuss some pertinent disaster management aspects of 
chlorine-related mass casualty (MASCAL) incidents. 
Industrial production of chlorine in the U.S. exceeds 
15 million tons annually. It is used in numerous industrial 
practices, including the manufacturing of paper, plastic and 
chemical products. It is also widely used in the municipal 
treatment of sewage and drinking water. Since chlorine 
production occurs in fewer than 20 states, it must be 
transported in large quantities to metropolitan centers. This 
large-scale transport and storage close to urban centers could 
make it an attractive target for extremist organizations. 
The use of chlorine could allow terrorists to deploy a 
chemical weapon in a highly populated area without having 
to manufacture or transport it themselves.1 An intentional 
release of chlorine by terrorists, bombing of storage vessels, 
or an unintentional release from an industrial incident could 
produce thousands of casualties. In fact an intentional release 
of chlorine, included as one of the Department of Homeland 
Security’s 15 “National Planning Scenarios,” could result 
in over 17,000 fatalities and 100,000 injuries if it occurred 
in a highly populated area2,3. Despite this, many at-risk 
communities are unaware of the volume of chlorine that is 
transported through their area. The following events document 
recent incidents involving chlorine releases and highlight 
some of the risks posed by chlorine gas.
RECENT INCIDENTS
January 6, 2005, Graniteville, SC 
One of the worst chlorine accidents in recent years 
occurred in Graniteville, South Carolina. A misplaced track 
switch resulted in a collision between a railroad tanker 
carrying chlorine and another train. The chlorine tank 
ruptured, venting 90 tons of chlorine gas into the surrounding 
area. The release resulted in nine fatalities. Eight were due to 
asphyxiation and occurred immediately. The ninth occurred 
within a day of admission to the hospital. There were also over 
520 visits to local emergency departments (EDs) or primary 
care offices for-chlorine related symptoms.4 Other non-
medical effects included disruption of the local community, 
with over 5,400 of the town’s 7,000 residents being evacuated 
for several days.4,5 
 
February 12, 2007, Tacoma, WA
Due to technician error when transferring chlorine from 
a rail car to storage containers in a bleach factory, over 900 
pounds of chlorine gas were released, forcing the closure 
of the Port of Tacoma.6,7 Although there were no fatalities, 
25 people required medical attention, including 12 first 
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them directly in the path of the chlorine gas. Despite the 
relatively low number of casualties caused by this incident, 
closure of North America’s seventh largest container port 
illustrates how a chlorine leak causes major disruption of 
transportation and shipping industries. 
August 29, 2007, Las Vegas, NV
Operator error caused a Union Pacific tanker car full of 
chlorine gas to accidentally escape from the Arden train yard. 
Although no toxic gas was released, the tanker traveled 20 
miles through densely populated areas before railroad workers 
and police were able to stop it. Based on prior estimates by the 
University of Nevada, the release of a full tanker of chlorine 
in such a populated area could have caused up to 90,000 
fatalities.8,9
Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2007
Insurgents in Iraq have recently executed multiple attacks 
using chlorine tanker trucks. On February 20, 2007, a tanker 
truck carrying chlorine was outfitted with explosives and 
detonated in Taji. Five people were killed in the blast and over 
140 others sought medical treatment for chlorine exposure.10,11 
The next day, another attack with chlorine resulted in two 
fatalities and over 30 treated at nearby hospitals for respiratory 
complaints.12 On March 16, 2007, insurgents conducted three 
separate attacks using chlorine. The attacks occurred during a 
three-hour period in several different cities. Over 350 civilian 
casualties resulted from exposure, with hundreds requiring 
medical treatment.13 On April 6, 2007, another incident 
involving a chlorine truck primed with explosives left 30 dead 
with over 50 seeking care at local hospitals for respiratory 
symptoms.14 Most of these attacks utilized explosive-fit 
chlorine tanker trucks. These unorthodox delivery methods 
demonstrate a willingness by extremist groups to use chlorine 
in heavily populated areas, and highlight the relative ease in 
acquiring large quantities. Weaponized chlorine has clearly 




Chlorine is element number 17 on the periodic table. It 
exists as a yellow-green gas at temperatures above -34°C. 
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Because this gas has a density greater than air, it tends to 
settle along the ground.15 All irritant gases have the potential 
to cause pulmonary injury, which is principally related to the 
duration of exposure. Irritant gases with high water solubility 
(e.g. ammonia) interact with oral, nasal and ocular mucosa 
rapidly causing discomfort. This warning property allows 
people to leave an area of exposure, limiting contact and 
thus reduces the likelihood of significant pulmonary damage. 
Irritant gases with low water solubility (e.g. phosgene) 
generate damaging caustic and oxidizing byproducts more 
slowly, resulting in very little warning properties. The 
absence of robust warning properties may result in prolonged 
exposures, allowing these agents to reach distal airways 
and produce greater pulmonary injury. Chlorine gas has 
an intermediate solubility, which gives it some warning 
properties, but may also allow for prolonged exposure and 
pulmonary damage.16,17 At 1-3 parts per million (PPM), 
chlorine starts to cause irritation of the mucus membranes. 
Pulmonary symptoms begin at exposures greater than 15 PPM, 
and concentrations greater than 430 PPM are fatal within 30 
minutes (Table 1).18,19 In comparison, the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) has set the permissible 
exposure limit (PEL) for an eight-hour time period at 1 PPM.20
Pathophysiology 
Chlorine’s toxic effects are due primarily to the 
production of hypochlorous and hydrochloric acid that 
occurs when elemental chlorine (Cl2) reacts with water. 
These two acids then further react to produce oxygen free 
radicals (Figure 1). In large exposures, the acids and free 
radicals then damage cell walls and interact with sulfhydryl 
groups on various amino acids and enzyme systems.16,18 
Histologic findings of this damage include bronchial edema, 
desquamation of epithelial cells, erosions and localized 
necrosis.2,21
Clinical Effects
Local irritation from acid results in an inflammatory 
response of the upper and lower airways leading to 
bronchospasm, cough and dyspnea. Disruption of cell 
membranes and proteins by the acids and free radicals results 
in death of alveolar cells and endothelial cells of adjacent 
capillaries. Clinical manifestations of this damage include 
pulmonary edema and Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome 
(ARDS).16,22 Fortunately, most patients with mild to moderate 
exposures will have resolution of their acute symptoms within 
three to five days and will have normal pulmonary function 
Table. Symptoms of chlorine exposure by concentration level
Concentration (PPM) Symptoms
1-3 Irritation of eyes and oral mucus mem-
branes
15 Onset of pulmonary symptoms
430 Fatal within 30 minutes
PPM, parts per million.
 
 
Cl2 + H2O  ↔  HCl + HOCl  ↔  2HCl + O
- 
Figure. Chlorine and water interact forming acid and oxidant 
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tests after several months.15,23 Some patients, however, 
will have chronic respiratory problems, such as reactive 
airway disease (RAD). While there is no way to predict which 
patients will develop long term complications, patients with 
a history of smoking or a prior history of RAD may be at 
increased risk..18
Although the most serious clinical effects of chlorine 
toxicity tend to be pulmonary, it can also cause skin and eye 
injuries. While dermal manifestations include irritation and 
pain, in severe exposures, chemical burns, including blister 
formation, can take place. Ocular complications include 
irritation and conjunctivitis. Severe cases can result in corneal 
defects.24 Chlorine also causes other non-specific symptoms, 
such as nausea, vomiting, rhinorrhea and headache.25
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES OF CHLORINE 
EXPOSURE
Pre-hospital and Personal Protective Measures
The most important aspect of managing a chlorine 
release is identification of the prevailing wind direction 
in order to stage upwind while establishing scene safety. 
Personal protective equipment (PPE) for all first responders 
is paramount. The incident in Tacoma resulted in pre-hospital 
provider injuries due to limited utilization of PPE and an 
unexpected shift in wind direction. This event illustrates the 
importance of the use of appropriate PPE for all responders, 
which should include self-contained respirators as well as 
eye and skin protection.19 According to OSHA standards, 
all personnel moving into high-risk areas must be issued 
positive pressure ventilation systems.26 This level of protection 
best corresponds to OSHA level A or level B PPE since 
both consist of positive pressure self-contained breathing 
apparatuses with full face plates as well as protective over 
garments.26 Per OSHA standard 910.120, if this type of 
system is not initially used, those conducting the preliminary 
assessment must be issued an escape breathing apparatus 
capable of operation for at least five minutes.26 Military 
personnel working in a contaminated area or working on the 
decontamination line should be outfitted in mission-oriented 
protective posture (MOPP) level 4 equipment.27 MOPP 
level 4 is roughly equivalent to OSHA level C PPE because 
it uses a chemical protective mask instead of a positive 
pressure breathing system. While this level of protection is 
insufficient to enter areas of high concentration, such as near a 
leaking chlorine tank, it does provide adequate protection for 
perimeter duty and work on the decontamination line. MOPP 
level 4 also represents the highest level of PPE that all U.S. 
soldiers are trained to use. Experience with higher levels of 
PPE, such as positive pressure respiratory systems, is reserved 
for specialized military HAZMAT teams.
 
Decontamination
Treatment of patients in the pre-hospital setting consists 
principally of decontamination and supporting the patient’s 
breathing. Decontamination, as with most chemical exposures, 
involves evacuation of the patient from the area of exposure, 
removing clothing, and irrigating with copious amounts of 
water. Although the duration of decontamination has not 
been conclusively identified, three to five minutes of rinse 
time has been advocated.19 While 0.5% chlorine solution is 
recommended for the decontamination of undifferentiated 
chemical exposures,27 it is not expected to be relevant in cases 
of chlorine-related casualties. Patients complaining of ocular 
irritation should undergo copious eye irrigation. Contact 
lenses should be removed to ensure proper irrigation.15,16 
Unlike people exposed to liquid chlorine, patients exposed 
to only chlorine vapor represent no significant risk of 
contaminating rescue workers (“off gasing”).24 Patients 
exposed to gaseous chlorine probably will not require any 
decontamination other than removal of the clothing. However, 
if they are experiencing ocular or dermal symptoms, they 
should undergo decontamination.2
Treatment
Pre-hospital support of respiratory injuries involves 
removing patients from the source of exposure, providing 
supplemental oxygen, and administering inhaled beta-agonists 
for patients with bronchospasm. For patients in extreme 
respiratory distress, rapid sequence intubation (RSI) should 
be considered, but this type of resource-intensive procedure 
may not be feasible if there are multiple casualties and limited 
resources cannot support such an intervention. The use of a 
standardized triage system can help to sort patients based on 
the severity of their injuries and to guide resource allocation in 
such a situation.
ED care of patients is supportive. However, it is very 
important that the ED be prepared to decontaminate patients 
who arrive via private vehicles since these patients may not 
have been decontaminated prior to arrival. During the disaster 
in Graniteville, over 95% of the patients arrived via private 
vehicle.4 After appropriate decontamination, skin wounds 
should be treated like other chemical burns, including: 
irrigation, tetanus prophylaxis, local wound care and 
analgesia. Eye irritation should prompt copious lavage and 
evaluation for corneal defects. Severe eye injuries, including 
any that result in a corneal defect, require ophthalmology 
consultation. If ophthalmologic consultation is not 
immediately available, patients with corneal defects should 
receive topical antibiotic prophylaxis to prevent bacterial 
superinfection. These patients also require ophthalmologic 
follow-up within the next few days.
Mild respiratory symptoms and bronchospasm can 
be treated with aerosolized beta-agonists. If a patient has 
a persistent cough but no respiratory distress, nebulized 
lidocaine (4 mL of a 4% solution) may provide symptomatic 
relief.28 For patients with severe respiratory distress, RSI 
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should be considered. Patients may develop ARDS, with its 
characteristic bilateral infiltrates on chest x-ray and hypoxia 
that does not improve with increased inspired oxygen 
concentration. Therefore, when a patient is intubated after a 
chlorine exposure, low tidal volumes (5-8 mL/kg ideal body 
weight) are recommended.29 The patient’s inspired oxygen 
concentration and peak expiratory end pressure (PEEP) can 
then be adjusted to maintain the patient’s oxygen saturation.
There is no specific antidote for chlorine exposures. 
Several studies have suggested that inhaled or parenteral 
steroids are effective at decreasing respiratory complications 
after chlorine exposure.30,31 The proposed mechanism is 
decreased recruitment of inflammatory mediators and 
immune cells, as well as increased stimulation of surfactant 
producing pneumocytes.32 One animal model showed a benefit 
of inhaled budesonide if administered within 30 minutes of 
exposure. This same study showed a significant decrease in 
improvement if treatment was delayed to 60 minutes, which 
suggests that steroids should be administered soon after an 
exposure when feasible.33 Nebulized sodium bicarbonate 
may be another adjunctive treatment for chlorine pulmonary 
exposures. Theoretically, inhaled bicarbonate can neutralize 
hypochlorous and hydrochloric acids, decreasing severity of 
lung injury. One non-randomized, placebo-controlled study of 
chlorine exposure reported improved pulmonary function tests 
(PFT), but patient-oriented benefits and long-term outcomes 
were not determined.34 Another study examining nebulized 
sodium bicarbonate revealed improved subjective symptoms, 
with no reported adverse effects.35 In both studies patients 
received concomitant inhaled beta-agonists and intravenous 
steroids. Another case series utilized bicarbonate without beta-
agonists or steroids in patients with mild chlorine exposures. 
All three patients subjectively improved after treatment with 
a 3.75% sodium bicarbonate nebulizer and no adverse effects 
were reported.36 The utility of nebulized bicarbonate has not 
been firmly established, and the optimal dose has also not been 
delineated. A reasonable dose is 3.75-5% nebulized over 20 
minutes and may be repeated. A 3.5% solution can be prepared 
by taking 2 mL of a 7.5% intravenous preparation of sodium 
bicarbonate solution (the concentration found in most cardiac 
“crash carts”) and combining with 2 mL of normal saline. 
Because precipitates can form if combined, it is important that 
nebulized sodium bicarbonate be administered separately from 
nebulized albuterol sulfate.37 Another theoretical treatment is 
the administration of an anti-oxidant such as N-acetyl cysteine 
(NAC). Although some data from animal models exists, there 
is currently not enough information to support the use of anti-
oxidants in a clinical setting.32,38
Some patients will present with minimal or no symptoms. 
A small percentage who are minimally symptomatic on 
presentation may go on to develop delayed pulmonary edema 
over a period of several hours.4 Therefore, patients with 
mild symptoms should be observed for eight to 24 hours for 
delayed onset of respiratory complications.17 Patients who are 
asymptomatic after their exposure can be discharged after six 
hours of observation, but must be counseled on symptoms that 
should prompt a return for further care.
Disaster and Mass Casualty (MASCAL) Considerations
Personnel moving into areas of higher concentration or 
prolonged exposure time will need appropriate HAZMAT 
equipment for respiratory and skin protection. First responders 
must be equipped with and trained to use this PPE prior to 
a major chlorine release. Because of the potential for large 
numbers of exposed patients who may require treatment 
and monitoring, a hospital can become overwhelmed. It is 
important that hospitals and municipalities have mutual-
aid agreements that coordinate the transfer of medications, 
equipment and personnel to the areas they are most needed. 
Especially important is respiratory support equipment. During 
the previously mentioned event in South Carolina, 10% of 
the hospitalized patients required intubation and mechanical 
ventilation.3 Additionally, incident command must help 
coordinate patient triage and transportation to appropriate 
medical facilities. Equitable distribution of patients based 
on each hospital’s surge capacity can minimize the strain on 
individual hospitals. 
Triage is an ongoing process, and must be repeated as 
patients move through the levels of decontamination. The 
initial level of decontamination is the “hot zone,” which is 
typically the actual incident location. The “warm zone” is 
geographically distant from the incident and is frequently the 
entry point to decontamination. This area can restrict patient 
flow and may be an appropriate time to re-triage. As patients 
complete the decontamination process, they pass from the 
“warm zone” to the “cold zone.” Upon reaching this area, 
patients may need to be re-triaged again, then directed to the 
appropriate level of care.39
A critical challenge to MASCAL incident command 
is maintaining clear and regular communication. People 
working or living in areas being evacuated must be notified 
of the need to leave, as well as safe evacuation routes that 
avoid exposure. The general population must be notified of 
signs and symptoms of chlorine exposure and then directed 
to triage and care areas for the “walking wounded.” Hospitals 
nearest the incident scene must be prepared to receive most of 
the “walking wounded,” as well as the most critical patients. 
There must also be a point of contact for friends and families 
seeking missing loved ones. The best mechanism for the 
spread of such information will vary, depending on the size 
and demographics of a given community.
SUMMARY
In addition to the occult HAZMAT threat, the intentional 
use of chlorine as an unconventional weapon is now 
occurring. Large chlorine stores in the U.S. are vulnerable 
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and lack adequate security. Operation Iraqi Freedom 
has demonstrated multiple events of successful use of 
weaponized chlorine transport vehicles, resulting in hundreds 
of casualties. Successful management of a chlorine MASCAL 
incident requires increased awareness and planning. As for 
all HAZMAT responses, proper equipment and training 
for first responders and a network of supporting medical 
facilities are needed to provide adequate care. Management 
of chlorine exposure involves decontamination and treatment 
of potential pulmonary injuries. Beta-agonists can be helpful 
for bronchospasm. Nebulized bicarbonate may decrease 
symptoms and prevent lung injury. Early corticosteroid use 
may play a role in treating lung inflammation and, possibly, 
preventing post-injury scarring. Severe cases may require 
endotracheal intubation and mechanical ventilation. While 
all these measures may prove useful in the treatment of 
patients after a chlorine exposure, further research is needed 
to delineate the optimal treatment regimen. Recognizing the 
evolving threat posed by chlorine, both in the form of an 
accidental release as well as an unconventional weapon, is an 
important first step to being prepared for this type of incident.
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